Reread the paragraph that begins “The effect of
the first difference is . . .” Why does Madison
believe that chosen government representatives
can control the effects of factions?
The Correct Answer and Explanation is :
Madison, in Federalist No. 10, argues that the chosen government representatives can control the effects of factions through a representative republic. The key idea is that the system of elected officials will act as a filter, selecting individuals who are more capable of making decisions that reflect the common good and manage the divisiveness that factions can create.
In the paragraph that begins, “The effect of the first difference is…” Madison explains that a large republic composed of a diverse population is less likely to have any single faction overpowering others. Since factions are groups of individuals with shared interests that conflict with the broader public good, Madison argues that the best way to control them is through the extended scope of the republic. The larger the republic, the more diverse the factions within it, and the less likely any single faction will be able to dominate the others.
Madison believes that representatives, being chosen by the people, are more likely to be virtuous and educated, and thus capable of rising above the influence of factions. He argues that representatives, unlike direct democracy where all citizens vote on every issue, can be trusted to deliberate and make decisions for the greater good, moderating factional conflict in the process. By being elected, these representatives are accountable to the people, but their extended terms of office and the checks and balances in the system encourage them to think more broadly than the narrow interests of any single faction.
Thus, Madison’s belief in controlling factions lies in the structure of the republic: the size of the nation, the system of representation, and the complexity of governance all work together to dilute the power of any one faction and ensure that decision-making focuses on the public good rather than on factional gains. This system, he contends, is more effective than a direct democracy in preventing the tyranny of any one group.